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Abstract
For each (individually rational) payoff configuration of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition
structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating payoff configurations that
terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive dominance
relation—which we label outsider independent—is employed.
 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
For a TU-game in coalitional form, there are two fundamental and strongly linked
problems:
(i) what coalitions will form, and
(ii) how will the members of these coalitions distribute their total worth.
We attempt to answer these questions for a certain class of games. We presuppose some
bargaining process and show that the coalition structure core, provided it is non-empty,
comes forward as a natural candidate for a solution.
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some coalition D could gain by acting for themselves, it can reject this initial payoff
configuration and propose a second payoff configuration. As in Shenoy (1979), Sengupta
and Sengupta (1994) and Greenberg (1994, p. 1326) the improving coalition D becomes
a member of the new coalition structure and none of the players in D looses when
moving towards the new payoff configuration. We impose an additional condition. The
counterproposal should be outsider independent: first, the new coalition structure should
contain those coalitions in the initial configuration that do not shelter deviating players;
and second, these unaffected coalitions obtain the very same payoffs. Hence, in contrast
to Shenoy and Sengupta and Sengupta, the deviating coalition D cannot prescribe the
structure and the payoffs of those coalitions that remain unaffected when the players in
D separate to form a coalition.1
Once a counterproposal is established, another coalition may reject this in favour of
a third payoff configuration, and so forth. Apparently, this bargaining process turns the
coalition structure core, if non-empty, into an accessible set of payoff configurations:
For each payoff configuration of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core,
there exists a finite sequence of successive ‘outsider-independent’ counterproposals that
terminates in the coalition structure core.
In the search for a dynamic foundation of the core, already Green (1974) made an
important contribution. He established a finite process of successive counterproposals that
almost surely reaches the core. Later on, Wu (1977) showed the existence of a bargaining
scheme that converges to the core and rephrased this result as the core is globally stable.
Finally, our result is a continuation of the work by Sengupta and Sengupta (1996).
Formulated in the language of von Neumann and Morgenstern, they proved the indirect
stability of the core: no payoff allocation dominates a core payoff configuration, and each
payoff configuration is indirectly dominated by a core payoff configuration. We refine this
stability property in two dimensions.
First, Sengupta and Sengupta (1996) (and also Green (1974) and Wu (1977))
concentrate on the core. Hence they do not tackle problem (i). They take the coalition
structure to be exogenously given and assume that the grand coalition forms. We also take
the coalition formation process into account and extend the stability result to the coalition
structure core.
Second, we extend the dominance relation employed by Sengupta and Sengupta (1996)
to a framework involving coalition structures. And here, as already explained, we motivate
a restrictive dominance relation based upon the outsider-independence condition.
The next section collects preliminaries, introduces the coalition structure core, and de-
fines outsider independent domination. Section 3 studies outsider independent dominating
chains and proves our result. The coalition structure core is characterised as the smallest
set of payoff configurations that satisfies this accessibility property.
1 Diamantoudi and Xue (2002) also criticise this feature of the dominance relation employed by Shenoy
(1979), Sengupta and Sengupta (1994).
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We introduce the notation and define games, payoff configurations, dominance, and the
coalition structure core. As we do not assume that the grand coalition forms, we use payoff
configurations (in the sense of e.g. Owen, 1995, Definition XIII.1.2) instead of imputations.
Let N = {1,2, . . . , n} be a set of n players. Non-empty subsets of N are called
coalitions. A partition is a set of pairwise disjoint coalitions so that their union is N and
represents the breaking up of the grand coalition N . For a partition P = {C1,C2, . . . ,Cm}
and a coalition C, following Owen (1995, Definition XIII.1.3) we define the partners’ set
P(C,P) of C in P as the union of those coalitions in P that have a non-empty intersection
with C.
A characteristic function v : 2N \ {∅} −→ R assigns a real value to each coalition. The
pair (N,v) is said to be a transferable utility game in characteristic function form, in short,
a game. An individually rational payoff configuration—thereafter: i.r.p.-configuration—
of a game (N,v) is a pair (x,P) where P is a partition of N and the real vector
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) listing the payoffs of each player satisfies
∀i ∈ N : xi  v
({i}) and ∀C ∈ P : x(C) = v(C),
with x(C) =∑j∈C xj . The first condition is known as individual rationality: player i will
cooperate to form a coalition only if his payoff xi exceeds the amount he would get on his
own. The second condition combines feasibility and the myopic behaviour of the players.
It states that the payoff vector x is efficient with respect to the coalition structure P : each
coalition in the partition P allocates its value among its members. I.r.p.-configurations with
the same payoff vector are said to be payoff equivalent. The set of all i.r.p.-configurations
is denoted by Ω(N,v). Note that Ω(N,v) is non-empty: it contains the i.r.p.-configuration
in which N is split up in singletons.
Definition 1 (Outsider independent domination). Let (N,v) be a game and let a =
(x,P) and b = (y,Q) be two i.r.p.-configurations. Then, i.r.p.-configuration a outsider-
independently dominates b by C if
C1: x(C) > y(C) and for all i ∈ C: xi  yi ,
C2: P contains C,
C3: (a) P also contains all coalitions in Q that do not intersect C, and
(b) xi = yi for all players i outside P(C,Q).
Coalition C is called the deviating coalition.
I.r.p.-configuration a outsider-independently dominates b if P contains a coalition C
such that a outsider-independently dominates b by C, and we abbreviate this as a o.i.-
dominates b.
Our definition is a restriction of widely used concepts of domination: If only Condition
C1 is satisfied we talk about domination at the level of payoffs, if Conditions C1 and C2
are satisfied, about domination at the level of i.r.p.-configurations. Conditions C3a and C3b
are referred to as the outsider independence conditions.
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o.i.-dominate b = (y,Q) by C. Then, if b is considered as the initial i.r.p.-configuration,
one can say that coalition C deviates and enforces the new i.r.p. configuration a. Indeed,
in order to obtain a higher total payoff, coalition C separates from its partners (and at least
one member of C gets strictly better off). The players in P(C,Q) \ C become ex-partners
of C. They may reorganise themselves and their payoffs might decrease when moving from
b to a. In the worst case, these ex-partners fall apart to singletons. Finally, the outsiders,
i.e. the players not in P(C,Q), are left untouched.
The definition clearly indicates that o.i.-domination is more restrictive than domination
at the level of i.r.p.-configurations, which was employed by Shenoy (1979) and Sengupta
and Sengupta (1994) among others and where the deviating coalition is allowed to affect
the payoffs of all the players and thus to ignore the behaviour and the motivation of the
outsiders. The use of o.i.-domination removes these privileges.
The o.i.-dominance relation also models a merger or a breaking up. In the former case,
the deviating coalition is the union of some of the coalitions in the initial partition. In the
latter case, an initial coalition is split up into two or more subcoalitions; each subcoalition
that is better off in the new i.r.p.-configuration can be considered as the deviating coalition.
Sengupta and Sengupta (1996) restrict their attention to the core, that is, they assume
that the grand coalition forms. As a consequence, they employ the dominance relation at
the level of payoff vectors. In contrast, we are also concerned with the coalition formation
process. We believe that in the context of coalition formation, the o.i.-dominance relation
is a natural and appropriate extension.
Now we repeat the definition of the coalition structure core, and we explain its relation
with the different domination relations.
Definition 2. Let (N,v) be a game and let Ω(N,v) be the set of i.r.p.-configurations.
The coalition structure core—abbreviated as c.s.-core—C(N,v) is the set of i.r.p.-configu-
rations (x,P) that satisfy coalitional rationality: for each coalition S we have x(S) v(S).
Balancedness conditions in order to check whether or not the c.s.-core is non-empty are
well known (see, e.g., Greenberg, 1994).
Proposition. The c.s.-core is insensitive to the domination concept used.
Proof. Consider a game with a non-empty c.s.-core and with a maximal total payoff
v∗ = maxQ∈Π
∑
C∈Q v(C), where Π is the set of partitions of N . Each i.r.p.-configuration
(x,P) in the c.s.-core satisfies x(N) = v∗. On the other hand an i.r.p.-configuration
b = (y,Q) does not belong to the coalition structure core as soon as soon there exists
coalition D such that y(D) < v(D). Such a blocking coalition D has an incentive to deviate
and is able to propose an i.r.p.-configuration a = (x,P) (with D in P) that o.i.-dominates
b and therefore dominates it also on the level of i.r.p.-configurations. The set of i.r.p.-
configurations that are not o.i.-dominated, the set of i.r.p.-configurations that are not domi-
nated at the level of i.r.p.-configurations and the coalition structure core all three coincide.
The same arguments hold in case the grand coalition forms and the core is non-empty.
An i.r.p.-configuration (y, {N}) does not belong to the core as soon it can be blocked by
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dominates it at the level of i.r.p.-configurations or outsider independently. In addition, D
can propose a new i.r.p.-configuration (x, {N}) such that x dominates y by D at the level
of payoffs. 
The c.s.-core might contain payoff equivalent i.r.p.-configurations. In case the grand
coalition forms, the c.s.-core includes the core.
3. The coalition structure core is accessible
Consider an initial i.r.p.-configuration. If a coalition can obtain a higher payoff, it is
allowed to deviate (respecting the outsider independence conditions) and to propose a
second i.r.p.-configuration, and so forth. This bargaining process gives rise to an o.i.-
dominating sequence. We show that for each i.r.p.-configuration there exists an o.i.-
dominating sequence that terminates in the c.s.-core. Let (N,v) be a game and let Ω =
Ω(N,v) be the set of all i.r.p.-configurations.
Definition 3. Let a, b ∈ Ω . I.r.p.-configuration a is said to be accessible from b, and we
write a ← b (or b → a), if
(i) a and b are payoff equivalent, or
(ii) a sequentially o.i.-dominates b, i.e. there exists a positive integer k and a sequence of
i.r.p.-configurations
a0 = b, a1, . . . , ak−1, ak = a
such that ai o.i.-dominates ai−1 for i = 1,2, . . . , k. The integer k is said to be the
length of (or the number of steps in) the o.i.-dominating sequence.
The relation ‘←’ describes a possible succession of transitions from an i.r.p.-configuration
to another one. We are interested in the i.r.p.-configurations that appear at the end of these
sequences.
Definition 4. Let ∆ be a set of i.r.p.-configurations. Then, ∆ is accessible if for each b in
Ω there exists an a in ∆ such that a ← b.
Our main result is a characterisation of the c.s.-core.
Theorem. The coalition structure core of a game, if non-empty, is the smallest ( for
inclusion) set of i.r.p.-configurations that is accessible.
The proof requires the following lemma.
Lemma. Let (N,v) be a game with a non-empty c.s.-core. Then, the c.s.-core is accessible.
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o.i.-dominated by an i.r.p.-configuration in C(N,v), the proof is done. In case no i.r.p.-
configuration in C(N,v) o.i.-dominates b0, we construct an o.i.-dominating sequence that
terminates in the c.s.-core. This sequence will be denoted by b0 → b1 → b2 → ·· · . As
a consequence, coalitions and individual payoffs have a double subscript the first one of
which refers to the position in this dominating sequence.
The proof is divided into five steps. In Step 1, we select those players that can be blamed
for not being able to go to the c.s.-core in one step. We call those players ‘overpaid.’ In
Step 2 we select a deviating coalition and in Step 3 we define an i.r.p.-configuration b1
that o.i.-dominates b0. In Step 4 we repeat Steps 2 and 3 and construct an o.i.-dominating
sequence b0, b1, b2, . . . . In Step 5 we show that this sequence reaches a c.s.-core i.r.p.-
configurations after a finite number of iterations.
Step 1. Defining the set of overpaid players. Interpret b0 = (y0,Q0) as the initial i.r.p.-
configuration. Let a = (x,P) be a c.s.-core i.r.p.-configuration. A player i for which
y0i > xi is said to be overpaid relative to a. Let O(b0, a) collect these overpaid players.
Since b0 is not dominated by a, the set O(b0, a) is non-empty.
Now, we consider the collection of c.s.-core i.r.p.-configurations that minimise the
number of overpaid players. Within this collection, we look for an i.r.p.-configuration a∗ =
(x∗,P∗) that minimises the amount overpaid y0(O0)−x∗(O0), where O0 = O(b0, a∗). We
consider a∗ as a c.s.-core i.r.p.-configuration close to b0. Since a∗ belongs to the c.s.-core,
we have that x∗(N) = v(P∗) = v∗.
Step 2. Selecting a deviating coalition. Since the i.r.p.-configuration b0 = (y0,Q0) is not
in the c.s.-core, there exists at least one blocking coalition, i.e. a coalition D for which
v(D) > y0(D). We select a deviating coalition D as follows. First, we inspect the coalitions
in the partition P∗ and we look for a blocking coalition D among P∗. Next, if the partition
P∗ does not contain a blocking coalition, then the i.r.p.-configuration b0 is efficient with
respect to P∗ and satisfies y0(N) = v∗. In that case we select a minimal (for inclusion)
blocking coalition.
Step 3. Defining a deviating i.r.p.-configuration. In order to define the payoff vector in
the deviating i.r.p.-configuration b1 = (y1,Q1) we consider the different types of players
separately.
First, we deal with the deviating players. Since D blocks b0 and a∗ is a c.s.-core i.r.p.-
configuration, we know that y0(D) < v(D)  x∗(D). Let i ∈ D. The payoff y1i depends
upon whether or not D contains overpaid players.
(1) If D does not contain overpaid players, then we define
y1i = y0i + δi(D) x∗i ,
with δi(D) non-negative and adding up to δ(D) = v(D) − y0(D).
(2) If D does contain overpaid players, then we define
y1i =
{
y0i + 1|D∩O0| [v(D) − y(D)] in case i is overpaid,
y0i in case i is not overpaid.
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members. The overpaid players are served first and consume the whole surplus. The non-
overpaid players experience either a status quo or an improvement.
Secondly, the ex-partners of D are assumed to split up into singletons. Hence, each
player i in P(D,Q0) \ D receives his value v({i}) as payoff.2
Thirdly, the outsiders remain untouched: if i /∈ P(D,Q0), then y1i = y0i . As such, we
meet the outsider independence conditions.
In conclusion: b1 o.i.-dominates b0. When moving from b0 to b1, the overpaid ex-
partners of D become non-overpaid. In case b1 is either a c.s.-core i.r.p.-configuration or
o.i.-dominated by a c.s.-core i.r.p.-configuration, the proof is complete. Otherwise, execute
the next steps.
Step 4. An iteration.
We denote the set O(b1, a∗) of overpaid players in the i.r.p.-configuration b1 by O1.
This set O1 is a subset of O0. We repeat Steps 2 and 3 and we generate an o.i.-dominating
sequence b0 → b1 → b2 → ·· · of i.r.p.-configurations and a corresponding sequence
O0 ⊇ O1 ⊇ O2 ⊇ · · · of sets of overpaid players. The next step shows the finiteness of
necessary iterations.
Step 5. The sequence b0 → b1 → b2 → ·· · enters the c.s.-core in a finite number of
iterations.
Along this o.i.-dominating sequence the set of overpaid players finds its minimal form,
denoted by O , after a finite number of iterations. Let bs = (ys,Ps ) be the first i.r.p.-con-
figuration in the sequence that satisfies Os = O . In case the partition Ps differs from P∗,
we can execute some more iterations (as described in Step 4). Due to the selection criteria
for the deviating coalition (Step 2) we obtain an i.r.p.-configuration bt = (yt ,Pt ) with
t  s, Ot = O , which is efficient with respect to P∗.3 The i.r.p.-configuration b = (yt ,P∗)
is payoff equivalent with bt .
We claim that the i.r.p.-configuration b is in the c.s.-core. Since b and bt are payoff-
equivalent, this immediately implies that bt is also in the c.s.-core.
In case O is empty this claim is obviously true. Hence, assume that O is non-empty
and that the iteration is unable to reduce it further. Denote the partners’ set of the overpaid
players in P∗ by B , i.e. B = P(O,P∗), and the complement of B by A.
Since A does not contain overpaid players, we have yi  x∗i for each i in A. Since
b belongs to Ω and since A is the union of some of the coalitions in P∗, we have
y(A) = x∗(A). Therefore, the payoff vectors y and x∗ restricted to A coincide: y|A = x∗|A.
We complete the proof of the claim (that b belongs to the c.s.-core) by contradiction.
Assume the existence of a coalition D that blocks the i.r.p.-configuration b. Since
y|A = x∗|A, the coalition D is not a subset of A. Hence D intersects B . Let D = P(D,P∗)
2 This assumption can be relaxed. The ex-partners are allowed to reorganise themselves provided none of them
is overpaid in the new i.r.p.-configuration.
3 Remember that in looking for a blocking coalition, the coalitions in P∗ are the first candidates to check.
Hence, for each i.r.p.-configuration that is not efficient with respect to P∗ , there will be an efficient i.r.p.-
configuration later on in the sequence.
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x∗(D) = v(D). Since O cannot be reduced, the coalition D contains all the overpaid
players in D. Therefore, D \ D only contains non-overpaid players and thus satisfies
y(D \ D)  x∗(D \ D). Use the efficiency of y and x∗ with respect to P∗ together with
the fact that a∗ is a c.s.-core i.r.p.-configuration to conclude that y(D)  x∗(D)  v(D).
Hence, D is not blocking. Contradiction.
Therefore, b and then also bt belong to the c.s.-core and the o.i.-dominating sequence
b0, b1, . . . , bt enters the c.s.-core after a finite number of iterations. 
In order to stress the impact of the particular construction in the above proof we give an
example of a bargaining scheme that does not enter the c.s.-core.
Example. Consider a three-player game in which each singleton has value 0, each pair has
value 2, and the grand coalition has value 6. The core is non-empty. Nevertheless, the next
three i.r.p.-configurations generate a cycle of dominating i.r.p.-configurations:(
(1,1,0), {1,2}, {3}), ((1,0,1), {1,3}, {2}), and ((0,1,1), {2,3}, {1}).
We conclude by the proof of the characterisation of the c.s.-core.
Proof of the Theorem. Accessibility follows from the previous lemma. Furthermore, each
i.r.p.-configuration in the c.s.-core is not o.i.-dominated. This implies minimality.
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